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Congressional Testimony

Statement of Administrator Brooks Before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Mar 2, 2005

Administrator Linton F. Brooks

  Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the FY 2006 Budget Request for the National NuclearSecurity Administration (NNSA). This is my third appearance before this Committee as the UnderSecretary for Nuclear Security, and I want to thank all of the Members for their strong support for ourimportant national security responsibilities.


In the fifth year of this Administration, with the strong support of Congress, NNSA has achieved alevel of stability that is required for accomplishing our long-term missions. Our fundamentalresponsibilities for U.S. national security include:

  • Stewardship of the Nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile;
  • Reducing the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
  • Providing reliable and safe propulsion for the U.S. Navy; and,
  • Managing the national nuclear security complex, which includes both security for ourfacilities and materials to protect our employees and our neighbors, and sustaining theweapons complex infrastructure.

This budget request supports the NNSA’s mission.

In his State of the Union Address in February, the President underscored the need to restrain spendingin order to sustain our economic prosperity. As part of this restraint, it is important that totaldiscretionary and non-security spending be held to levels proposed in the FY 2006 Budget. Thebudget savings and reforms in the Budget are important components of achieving the President's goalof cutting the budget deficit in half by 2009 and we urge the Congress to support these reforms. Tosupport the President’s goal, most programs in NNSA’s budget of $9.4 billion are funded at levels lessthan we projected last year.

The major exceptions are those nonproliferation programs that directly affect homeland security.Consistent with the President’s priorities, we have increased funding for activities associated withnonproliferation by 15 percent on top of the already significant budgets of last year, for a total requestof $1.6 billion. That increase has been targeted for research on proliferation detection technologies,for programs to improve the security of weapons material outside the United States, and to detect suchmaterial in transit.

The international community faces a variety of new and emerging threats. As the events of September11, 2001 made clear, new sub-national threats are emerging that involve hostile groups willing to useor support the use of low-tech weapons of great destructive capability. If these groups come to possessnuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), they would pose an even greater threatto the United States. Thus, diplomatic, political, and other efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclearweapons, weapons-usable materials, or chemical or biological weapons, in conjunction with a robustcounter-terrorism effort and defenses, are the best means available to address this threat.

The FY 2006 request in our Stockpile Stewardship Program also makes adjustments to ensure that wecontinue to meet our commitments to the Department of Defense (DoD). In the post-Cold War world,nuclear weapons play a critical but reduced role in the Nation’s overall security posture. Nuclearforces – linked with an advanced conventional strike capability and integrated with a responsiveinfrastructure – continue to be an essential element of national security by strengthening our overallability to reassure allies of U.S. commitments, dissuade arms competition from potential adversaries,and deter threats to the U.S., its overseas forces, allies, and friends.

Key elements of our nuclear posture involve strategies that enable the U.S. to quickly adapt andrespond to unanticipated changes in the international security environment or to unexpected problemsor “surprises” in the status of our nuclear forces. As our Nation’s nuclear stockpile draws down tolevels established in the Treaty of Moscow – between 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategicnuclear warheads – the U.S. will also reduce dramatically the total number of warheads in thestockpile. The June 2004 Report to Congress, “A Revised Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for 2012”,lays out our plans to meet this goal by 2012.

A critical strategy to support these reductions is to establish a flexible and responsive nuclear weaponsinfrastructure to support future defense requirements. A responsive NNSA infrastructure – people andfacilities – includes innovative science and technology research and development at the Nationallaboratories and agile production facilities that are able to meet identified needs and are capable ofresponding to unanticipated problems in the stockpile.

The initiative for NNSA to develop a more responsive infrastructure was first developed in the NuclearPosture Review submitted to Congress in January 2002. That Review couples the plan for stockpilereductions, agreed to in the Treaty of Moscow, with the ability to respond quickly to any surpriseevents in the future, such as an unexpected degradation in certified performance of a U.S. stockpileweapon or, on the world scene, an unanticipated military threat. On that basis, NNSA is nowdeveloping its capabilities to employ its weapons infrastructure in the required “responsive” way. Thisplan is now under development and will begin to be evident when we provide the FY 2007 budget tothe Congress, since it is tied directly to the 2012 commitment for 1,700-2,200 operationally deployedstrategic warheads.

The NNSA is also evaluating what the weapons complex should look like in the future. A Nuclear3Weapons Complex Infrastructure Study, directed by the House Report accompanying the FY 2005Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, is underway and is scheduled to be complete bythe end of April 2005. The Study is being run as a task force under the Secretary of Energy’s AdvisoryBoard.

NNSA’s principal mission is to assure that the Nation’s nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, andreliable. A rigorous program enables the Secretaries of Energy and Defense to report each year to thePresident on the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile. StockpileStewardship activities are carried out without the use of underground nuclear testing, continuing theU.S. moratorium on testing initiated in the early 1990’s. This is made possible by using science-basedjudgments informed by cutting edge scientific and engineering tools as well as extensive laboratoryand flight tests. We are gaining a more complete understanding of the stockpile each year. Computercodes and platforms developed by our Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) campaign are nowused to address three-dimensional issues in weapons performance.

NNSA also is working, through weapon refurbishment, to ensure that an aging stockpile is ready tomeet Department of Defense requirements. The W87 Life Extension Program was completed inSeptember 2004 and the remaining Life Extension Programs are progressing well. A significantlylower number of refurbishments are expected as a result of a reduced stockpile, with savings beingrealized in the next decade. We are also producing new tritium for the first time since 1988 and thenew Tritium Extraction Facility at Savannah River is ahead of schedule and under budget. LosAlamos National Laboratory remains on track to certify a war reserve W88 pit by 2007. As articulatedin our January 2005 Report to Congress, we are refining plans for a Modern Pit Facility.

The Nation continues to benefit from advances in science, technology and engineering fostered by thenational security program activities, including cutting edge research and development carried out inpartnership with many of the Nation’s colleges, universities, small businesses and minority educationalinstitutions. The NNSA programs, including three national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and theproduction facilities across the U.S. employ nearly 2,300 Federal employees and approximately35,000 contractor employees to carry out this work.

We are also continuing to advance our nonproliferation objectives worldwide. In June 2002, theUnited States championed a new, comprehensive nonproliferation effort known as the GlobalPartnership. World leaders committed to provide up to $20 billion over 10 years to fundnonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. The NNSA contributes directly to this effort bycarrying out programs with the international community to reduce and prevent the proliferation ofnuclear weapons, materials and expertise. The security of our Nation and the world are enhanced byNNSA’s ongoing work to provide security upgrades for military and civilian nuclear sites andenhanced border security in Russia and the Former Soviet Union. In the past year, we have completedcomprehensive materials protection control and accountability upgrades at six Russian Navy andStrategic Rocket Forces nuclear weapon facilities, and we are now beginning efforts to install securityupgrades at vulnerable Russian 12th Main Directorate sites.

We are planning a significant increase to the Megaports initiative, an effort to install radiationdetection equipment at the world’s largest seaports to screen large volumes of container traffic headed4for the United States well before it gets to our shores. This is a relatively new program and we alreadyhave agreements in place with several countries and are looking for more. With the support of theCongress, we hope to complete installation of detection equipment at 24 ports by 2010. We arereducing the world’s stocks of dangerous materials such as plutonium through NNSA-sponsoredFissile Materials Disposition programs in the U.S. and Russia as well as through elimination ofRussian plutonium production. We have also initiated the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) toidentify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate the disposition of high-risk vulnerable nuclear andradiological materials and equipment around the world that pose a threat to the United States and to theinternational community.

The Nation benefits from NNSA’s work in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security todevelop and demonstrate new detection technologies to improve security of our cities and ports.Perhaps the most tangible benefits to the Nation following the 9/11 terrorist attacks are the “firstresponder teams” of highly specialized scientists and technical personnel from the NNSA sites who aredeployed across the Nation to address threats of weapons of mass destruction. These teams workunder the direction of the NNSA Office of Emergency Operations, Department of Homeland Securityand the Federal Bureau of Investigation to respond to nuclear emergencies in the U. S. and around theworld. In the past year, these teams have provided support to such diverse groups and locations as …The teams adapt to changing technologies and evolving challenges associated with combatingterrorism and accident/incident scenarios in today’s world. Outstanding performance in training,exercises, and real world events continues to justify NNSA's reputation for having one of the world'spremier nuclear and radiological technical emergency response capabilities.

The NNSA also works in partnership with the DoD to meet their needs for reliable and militarilyeffective nuclear propulsion for the U.S. Navy. In the past year, the Naval Reactors Program hascompleted the reactor plant design for the VIRGINIA-class submarine, and supported “safe steaming”of another two million miles by our nuclear-powered ships. They have continued their unsurpassedrecord of “clean up as you go”, including remediating to “green grass” the former S1C prototype Siteat Windsor, Connecticut, and completing a successful demonstration of the interim naval spent fuel drystorage capability in Idaho.


The FY 2006 budget request totals $9.4 billion, an increase of $233.3 million or 2.5 percent. We aremanaging our program activities within a disciplined five-year budget and planning envelope. We aredoing it successfully enough to be able to address emerging new priorities and provide for neededfunding increases in some of our programs – notably in Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation –within anoverall modest growth rate by reallocating from other activities and projects that are concluded orbeing rescoped.

NNSA Budget Summary
(dollars in millions)

FY2006 NNSA Budget Summary


The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is one area of the NNSA budget where missionpriorities require us to request significant increases in funding for FY 2006. The convergence ofheightened terrorist activities and the associated revelations regarding the ease of moving materials,technology and information across borders has made the potential of terrorism involving weapons ofmass destruction (WMD) the most serious threat facing the Nation. Preventing WMD from falling intothe hands of terrorists is the top national security priority of this Administration. The FY 2006 budgetrequest of $1.64 billion for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation represents an unprecedented effort toprotect the homeland and U.S. allies from this threat.

The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program goal is to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferationof Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) while mitigating nuclear risk worldwide. Our programsaddress the danger that hostile nations or terrorist groups may acquire weapons of mass destruction orweapons-usable material, dual-use production or technology, or WMD capabilities, by securing oreliminating vulnerable stockpiles of weapon-usable materials, technology, and expertise in Russia andother countries of concern.Over the last four years the United States, in collaboration with the international community throughjoint nonproliferation programs, has had much success in preventing the spread of weapons of massdestruction. Some of these successes supported by NNSA’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Programinclude: a two year acceleration in securing 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material at 51 sites inRussia and the Newly Independent States; upgrading 13 nuclear facilities in the Newly IndependentStates in the Baltic region to meet international physical protection guidelines; and establishing theMegaports Initiative that I mentioned earlier.

The Administration is requesting $1.64 billion to support activities to reduce the global weapons ofmass destruction proliferation threat, about $214 million or a 15 percent increase over comparableFY 2005 activities. The Administration has targeted both the demand and supply side of the nuclearterrorism challenge with aggressive nonproliferation programs that have achieved a number of majorsuccesses in recent years. Through the Global Partnership with the G-8 nations, the United States isdedicating the necessary resources to combat this complex threat, committing to provide half of the$20 billion for this effort, including $1 billion in FY 2006 in programs through NNSA, DoD and theDepartment of State.

For FY 2006, $343.4 million is included to support the International Nuclear Materials Protectionand Cooperation program to secure nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union, a 16.6 percentincrease over the FY 2005 enacted appropriation. For over a decade, the United States has beenworking cooperatively with the Russian Federation to enhance the security of facilities containingfissile material and nuclear weapons. The scope of these efforts has been expanded to protectweapons-usable material in countries outside the Former Soviet Union as well. These programs fundcritical activities such as installation of intrusion detection and alarm systems, and construction offences around nuclear sites. Efforts to complete this work and to secure facilities against the possibilityof theft or diversion have been accelerated.

A number of major milestones for this cooperative program are on the near horizon and the FY 2006 budget ensures that sufficient funding will be available to meet these milestones. Security upgradeswill be completed for Russian Navy nuclear fuel and weapons storage by the end of FY 2006 and forRosatom facilities by the end of FY 2008—both two years ahead of the original schedule. RussianStrategic Rocket Forces sites will be completed in 2007, one year ahead of schedule. Additionally,cooperation will begin with the nuclear warhead storage sites of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s 12thMain Directorate. By the end of 2006, NNSA will have supported completion of security upgrades atnearly 80 percent of the sites covered by the current bilateral agreement to secure nuclear materials andnuclear warheads in Russia and the Newly Independent States.

FY 2006 funding for the Megaports initiative, another part of the International Nuclear MaterialsProtection and Cooperation program, is requested at $74 million, a $59 million increase, to continue todeploy radiation detection equipment at key overseas ports to pre-screen U.S. bound cargo containersfor nuclear or radioactive materials. These materials could be concealed in any of the millions ofcargo containers in various stages of transit throughout the world's shipping network.

However, the busiest seaports also provide an opportunity for law enforcement officials to pre-screenthe bulk of the cargo in the world trade system. Under the Megaports Initiative, DOE cooperates withinternational partners to deploy and equip key ports with the technical means to detect and deter illicittrafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. This effort supports the U.S. Department ofHomeland Security’s Container Security Initiative. The FY 2006 budget supports the completion offive ports, which will increase to ten the number of ports equipped through the Megaports Initiative.

Increased resources are being requested for the Nonproliferation and Verification Research andDevelopment program in FY 2006. The budget of $272.2 million supports proliferation detection andnuclear explosion monitoring efforts. The additional $48.3 million above the enacted FY 2005appropriations will be used to leverage the technical expertise and experience of the NationalLaboratories and universities to provide a crucial boost to our basic and applied radiation detection andradiochemistry science efforts. This research will develop improved basic radiation detector materialsand radiochemistry analytical capabilities, as well as the applied technologies that will enable fieldingour advanced technology in support of global nonproliferation missions. We need detectors andcapabilities that are more sensitive, smaller, durable, and economical - the increase in basic andapplied research will help us to achieve that goal.

Funding for the Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production (EWGPP) in Russia isrequested at $132 million in FY 2006. This program will result in the permanent shutdown of threeRussian nuclear reactors, which currently produce weapons-grade plutonium. These reactors, whichare the last three reactors in Russia that produce plutonium for military purposes, also providenecessary heat and electricity to two Russian “closed cities” in the Russian nuclear weapons complex.This budget provides the funding needed to shutdown the three reactors through 1) refurbishment of anexisting fossil fuel (coal) power plant in Seversk by 2008; and 2) construction of a new fossil-fuelplant at Zheleznogorsk by 2011. This will eliminate the production of 1.2 metric tons annually ofweapons-grade plutonium. The program is of critical importance because plutonium that is nevercreated does not have to be accounted for, does not need to be secured, and will not be available to betargeted by terrorists. . The EWGPP program has been working with the Army Corps of Engineers (COE) to perform an independent cost review of both projects. The Seversk review has beencompleted and the COE found the project cost to be valid and reasonable. The Zheleznogorsk studywill be completed later in FY2005.

At $98 million, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program, a newly created initiativeannounced in 2004, brings together key activities that support the goal to identify, secure, remove andfacilitate the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipmentaround the world. Our Nation has begun to reap the benefits of this initiative with the successfulcompletion of two shipments of Russian-origin fresh high-enriched uranium nuclear fuel to Russiafrom foreign research reactors. These shipments fall under one of several programs geared towardimplementing the U.S. highly enriched uranium minimization policy.

The NNSA is requesting $653 million in FY 2006 to continue to support the Fissile MaterialsDisposition program to dispose of surplus weapons-grade fissile materials under an agreementbetween the United States and Russia. Both countries have agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons ofplutonium by converting it to a mixed oxide fuel and burning it in electricity-generating nuclearreactors.

We are working to design and build facilities to dispose of these inventories in the U.S. and aresupporting concurrent efforts in Russia to obtain reciprocal disposition of similar materials. One of thekey obstacles is an ongoing disagreement with Russia regarding liability protectionfor plutonium disposition work performed in that country.

This has resulted in a significant delay in the planned start of construction of the MOX FuelFabrication facilities and the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility. I am cautiously optimistic thatwe are over the hurdle on this issue but details still need to be negotiated and finalized. Please beassured that we remain committed to building these facilities and to the long-term objectives of theprogram. We will keep you posted as progress is made. The FY 2006 net increase is primarily for theOff-specification HEU Blend-Down Project with TVA and increased oversight to support majorconstruction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication facility in FY 2006.


The FY 2006 budget request for the programs funded within the Weapons Activities appropriation is$6.63 billion, less than a one percent increase over FY 2005. This request emphasizes programssupported by the Nuclear Posture Review, which directed that NNSA maintain a research,development, and manufacturing base that ensures the long-term effectiveness of the Nation’sstockpile. This request also supports the facilities and infrastructure that must be responsive to new oremerging threats.

Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) is one of our areas of special emphasis this year with an FY 2006request of $1.4 billion, an 11 percent increase over FY 2005. The increase is needed to ensure that wecontinue to meet DoD requirements. Without question, our focus remains on the stockpile, but we are9looking ahead. The United States is continuing work to refurbish and extend the life of the warheadsin the stockpile though the life extension program. Work on the life extensions are progressing well,with the W87 LEP being completed in September 2004. First Production Units are scheduled for threeother systems, the B61, W76 and W80, in the FY 2006-2009 timeframe.

In FY 2006, DSW funding will support resumption of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)feasibility and cost study with $4.0 million requested. Resumption of the RNEP study was requestedby the Secretary of Defense after his personal review. I would like to point out that we are only askingfor funds to complete a truncated study that began May 1, 2003 – one system only, not two asoriginally proposed, so the costs will be lower. I would also like to emphasize that absolutely nodecisions have been reached, there is no engineering development work planned which would require Congressional approval and there is no funding being requested past FY 2007. We have alsoeliminated the contingency funding for follow-on work shown in last year’s FYNSP. I believe theAdministration and the Congress need to have an important discussion about the need for thiscapability but it would be best to complete the feasibility and cost study so we can all make aninformed decision.

Congress appropriated $9.0 million in FY 2005 for the Reliable Replacement Warhead. We think thisis an excellent way to reduce costs and maintain the stockpile and we have requested $9.4 million inFY 2006, about a 4.7 percent increase, to continue this initiative.

Progress in other parts of the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues. The FY 2006 request forCampaigns is $2.1 billion. This request funds a variety of Campaigns, experimental facilities andactivities that continue to enhance NNSA’s confidence in “science-based” judgments for stockpilestewardship, and provide cutting edge technologies for stockpile certification and maintenance.Without question, our Campaigns are providing immediate and tangible benefits to the stockpile.

While there is no reason to doubt the ability of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to continue toensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear deterrent, the Nation must maintain the abilityto carry out an underground nuclear weapons test in the event of some currently unforeseen problemsthat cannot be resolved by other means. Consistent with the law, we are improving our readinessposture from the current ability to test within 24 to 36 months to an ability to test within 18 months.The FY 2006 budget request of $25.0 million supports achieving an 18-month readiness posture bySeptember 2006. We will achieve a 24-month readiness posture in FY 2005. But let me be clear,there are no plans to test.

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) continues tobe an essential component of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Consistent with the strong views ofthe Congress, we are continuing towards full commissioning of all 192 beams and focus on the 2010ignition goal. To do this, however, we have had to accept additional risks and reduce some otherinertial confinement fusion work at other sites. The FY 2006 request of $460.4 million for the Inertial10Confinement Fusion and High Yield Campaign, a 14% reduction from FY 2005, reflects thosereductions. Inertial fusion ignition is the greatest technical challenge ever pursued by the Department.Ignition has never been achieved in the laboratory and this scientific advance will benefit severalnational endeavors.

The Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) at Los Alamos NationalLaboratory (LANL) is already producing the highest quality images of simulated primary implosionsever obtained. As you can imagine, this was an area of very high interest during the LANLsuspension. The first hydro test in many months is expected in March 2005 to support the W76 LEP.The FY 2006 request of $27.0 million will support repair and commissioning of the second axis toprovide time sequence information required for future weapon primary certification.

The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) request for FY 2006 is $660.8 million, a decrease of4.7 percent from FY 2005. This will fund the current and planned operating platforms and the codesemployed by designers and scientists in Stockpile Stewardship Program. In FY 2006, the ASCprogram will improve physics and materials models to more accurately represent the complex physicalphenomena in our weapons systems. For example, incremental improvements in Plutonium Equationof State and materials models will be incorporated into our modern codes. Efforts in Verification andValidation of the simulation tools will lead to improved confidence in simulation as a key componentof stockpile assessment. FY 2006 formal code releases will be provided to the design community forthe W76-1 LEP.

The NPR recognized a long-term need for a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) to support the pitmanufacturing requirements of the entire stockpile. NNSA’s FY 2006 request for MPF is $7.7 million,which is included in the $248.8 million request for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign.As articulated in our January 2005 Report to Congress, we are refining plans for a Modern PitFacility. LANL remains on track to certify a war reserve W88 pit by 2007 and we are reestablishingthe technology base to manufacture all pit types in the stockpile.

The Readiness Campaign request is $218.8 million in FY 2006, a decrease of about 16 percent. Thedecrease is attributable mainly to the postponement of lower priority activities such as risk mitigationprojects for the Life Extension Programs that are the least likely to impact life extension needs andalso major items of equipment.

NNSA’s Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities activities operate and maintain current facilitiesand ensure the long-term vitality of the NNSA complex through a multi-year program of infrastructureconstruction. About $1.6 billion is requested for these efforts, a decrease of 8.7% from FY 2005. Funding for three new construction starts is requested and five candidate projects are in engineeringdesign.

In FY 2006, the budget request is $212.1 million for Secure Transportation Asset, a 6.2 percentincrease over FY 2005 levels, for meeting the Department’s transportation requirements for nuclearweapons, components, and special nuclear materials shipments. Hiring of additional federal agents andproduction of additional SafeGuards Transporters to meet the increased workload and new DesignBasis Threat security requirements accounts for the increase. The remainder of the Weapons Activities appropriation funding is for Nuclear Weapons IncidentResponse, Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization, and Safeguards and Security.


The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) is essential to NNSA’s ability tocontinue revitalization of the complex consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review. The program isdelivering on its mission to reduce deferred maintenance and restore the condition of facilities andinfrastructure across the complex. I consider FIRP to be a true NNSA “success story”, and am pleasedto note that the National Research Council has commended NNSA’s progress and execution of realproperty asset management as the most advanced within DOE. The FY 2006 FIRP request of$283.5 million is a decrease of 9.6 percent over FY 2005. For the outyears, we intend to rebalancethe FIRP budget profile presented in this President’s Budget, within the overall NNSA budgetallocation, to ensure the program’s ability to accomplish its mission and fulfill its commitment toCongress.


Environmental compliance is the focus of another management challenge to us. Let me begin bysaying that the NNSA of the Future accepts responsibility for our environmental work at NNSA sites.The FY 2006 budget reflects the functional transfer of scope, funding and the associated Federal stafffrom the Office of Environmental Management (EM) to the NNSA. These functional transfers alignresponsibility with accountability, ensure clear accounting of the total cost of ownership, and improveoverall effectiveness and efficiency. The transfers resolve existing inefficiencies caused by theduplicate EM/NNSA chain of command that has existed since the inception of the NNSA Act. TheNNSA Act precludes EM from providing direction to NNSA employees or contractors – yet EM hasdirect control of budgeting and funding authority, and is accountable for environmental activities atNNSA sites. The current EM/NNSA management structure results in confused lines of authority thatimpede cost-effective and timely implementation of the cleanup program at NNSA sites. I would liketo highlight that this is a zero sum budget transfer, which results in no increases to the Department’soverall funding or staffing. I believe the transfer is essential to the effective and efficient operations ofenvironmental activities at NNSA sites and the only viable alternative for the NNSA.

The transferred mission from EM is included in NNSA's FY 2006 Request of $174.4 million inEnvironmental Projects and Operations. The environmental transfer activities include environmentalrestoration, legacy waste management and disposition, and decontamination and decommissioning atsites where NNSA has continuing missions. Specifically, the transfers include: Kansas City Plant;Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Main Site and Site 300); Nevada Test Site (including thewaste disposal facilities); Pantex Plant; Sandia National Laboratories; and the Separations ProcessResearch Unit. Environmental activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Y-12 NationalSecurity Complex are expected to transfer in FY 2007. Additionally, the request in the Readiness inTechnical Base and Facilities under operations of facilities includes a total of $47.0 million for newly12generated waste at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Y-12 National SecurityComplex (responsibility for newly generated waste at other NNSA sites was previously transferred byprior agreements).

We will manage all environmental activities that transfer within the newly established EnvironmentalProjects and Operations Program, with the exception of newly generated waste, which will bemanaged by Defense Programs. We plan to use NNSA’s successful Facilities and InfrastructureRecapitalization Program (FIRP) as the business model for managing our new environmentalresponsibilities. This includes strong central management and accountability for results; best-in-classbusiness practices; and transparency in budget and program performance.

During this year of transition, NNSA, both in tandem with EM staff and “on our own”, have beenmeeting with various outside organizations to not only discuss the proposed transfer, but also to gaininsight into the ongoing issues and be able to represent NNSA’s perspectives as well. We haveroutinely scheduled meetings with EPA Headquarters and Regions to discuss emerging regulatoryissues, proposed rulemaking, and region-specific issues. NNSA staff, with EM, has engaged withregulators, Tribal entities, Citizen’s Advisory Boards on cleanup end state definition and other topicspertinent to clean up and environmental compliance at all of the NNSA sites that will be transferring.NNSA staff has met with Tribal entities to entertain dialog on Tribal issues regarding this transfer. Ipersonally addressed the combined intergovernmental meeting in December of the NationalGovernor’s Association, Energy Communities Alliance, National Governor’s Association , NationalAssociation of Attorneys General, and State and Tribal Government Working Group.


The Nuclear Weapons Incident Response request of $118.8 million is 9.6% above the FY 2005 level.This represents a 7.6% program growth to bring first responder capability more into line with theirincreased responsibilities and operations tempo. It replaces outdated and inoperable equipment,provides qualification training, and develops and fields a communications kit that resolvesincompatibility issues. It further provides for development and implementation of a first responderoutreach program and provides a modest increase to the Technology Integration program, thus makingthe equipment purchase program more effective.


Protecting the Nation’s assets is one of our highest priorities. The growth of our requests for theSafeguards and Security budget over the last five years clearly reflects our commitment to security.In FY 2001, our request for safeguards and security was $ 406.4 million. In FY 2003, the requestgrew to $ 510.0 million--the first fiscal reflection of the more dangerous security environmentrecognized after 9/11. That funding and the increased amounts received in successive years has beenused to further enhance our already strong security posture.

The FY 2006 request for Safeguards and Security is $ 740.5million. NNSA sites are on track toimplement the requirements contained in the May 2003 Design Basis Threat Policy by the end of13FY 2006. Assessment and planning to meet the higher threat delineated in the October 2004 revisionto the Design Basis Threat Policy will be completed in the third quarter of this year. The budgetrequest adequately funds our efforts to meet this refinement in FY 2006, but we are facing someshortfalls in subsequent years that we are going to have to deal with.

We have made significant improvements in the readiness of our protective forces and the physicalplants they defend at the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, the Y-12National Security Complex, the Pantex Plant and the Nevada Test Site. Where we have foundweaknesses based upon our own reviews or reviews conducted by others, these weaknesses have beenfixed. We are moving ahead smartly to ensure the special nuclear materials entrusted to the NNSA arestored in modern secure facilities. To this end, we have begun moving material from the TA-18 site atLos Alamos to the Device Assembly Facility on the Nevada Test Site—one of our most modernfacilities designed specifically for security. We have also accelerated the construction of the HighlyEnriched Uranium Materials Facility at Y-12 for storage of materials currently located in some of ouroldest facilities. We have worked through our difficulties with the security of classified removableelectronic media at Los Alamos and have implemented strict policies and procedures to control suchdata and ensure accountability in the future.


The Naval Reactors FY 2006 budget request of $786 million is a decrease of $15.4 million from FY2005. The majority of funding supports sustaining the Navy’s 103 operational nuclear reactors. Thiswork involves continual testing, analysis, and monitoring of plant and core performance whichbecomes more critical as the reactor plants age. The nature of this business demands a careful,measured approach to developing and verifying nuclear technology; designing needed components,systems, and processes; and implementing them in existing and future plant designs. Most of thiswork is accomplished at Naval Reactors’ DOE laboratories. These laboratories have made significantadvancements in extending core lifetime, developing robust materials and components, and creating anarray of predictive capabilities.

Naval Reactors’operations and maintenance budget request is categorized into four areas oftechnology: Reactor Technology and Analysis; Plant Technology; Materials Development andVerification; and Evaluation and Servicing.

The $213.9M requested for Reactor Technology and Analysis will support continued work on thedesign for the new reactor plant for the next generation of aircraft carriers, CVN-21. These efforts alsosupport the design of the Transformational Technology Core (TTC), a new high-energy core that is adirect outgrowth of the Program’s advanced reactor technology and materials development andverification work.

Reactor Technology and Analysis also develops and improves the analysis tools which can be used tosafely extend service life beyond our previous experience base. The increasing average age of ourNavy’s existing reactor plants, along with future extended service lives, a higher pace of operation andreduced maintenance periods, place a greater emphasis on our work in thermal-hydraulics, structuralmechanics, fluid mechanics, and vibration analysis. These factors, along with longer-life cores, mean14that for years to come, these reactors will be operating beyond our previously proven experience base.

The $143.8M requested for Plant Technology provides funding to develop, test, and analyzecomponents and systems that transfer, convert, control, and measure reactor power in a ship’s powerplant. Reactor plant performance, reliability, and safety are maintained through a full understanding ofcomponent performance and system condition over the life of each ship. Naval Reactors is developingcomponents to address known limitations and to improve reliability of instrumentation and powerdistribution equipment to replace aging, technologically obsolete equipment. Additional technologydevelopment in the areas of chemistry, energy conversion, instrumentation and control, plantarrangement, and component design will continue to support the Navy’s operational requirements.

The $145.1M requested for Materials Development and Verification funds material analyses andtesting to provide the high-performance materials necessary to ensure that naval nuclear propulsionplants meet Navy goals for extended warship operation and greater power capability. More explicitly,materials in the reactor core and reactor plant must perform safely and reliably for the extended life ofthe ship. Funds in this category also support Naval Reactors’ share of work at the Advanced TestReactor (ATR), a specialized reactor plant materials testing facility operated by the DOE Office ofNuclear Energy, Science, and Technology.

The $183.4M requested for Evaluation and Servicing sustains the operation, maintenance, andservicing of Naval Reactors’ operating prototype reactor plants and the remaining share of NavalReactors’ ATR operations. Reactor core and reactor plant materials, components, and systems in theseplants provide important research and development data and experience under actual operatingconditions. These data aid in predicting and subsequently preventing problems that could develop inFleet reactors. With proper maintenance, upgrades, and servicing, the two prototype plants and theATR will continue to meet testing needs for at least the next decade.

Evaluation and Servicing funds also support the implementation of a dry spent fuel storage productionline that will put naval spent fuel currently stored in water pits at the Idaho Nuclear Technology andEngineering Center and at the Expended Core Facility (ECF) on the Naval Reactors facility in Idahointo dry storage. Additionally, these funds support ongoing decontamination and decommissioning ofinactive nuclear facilities at all Naval Reactors sites to address their “cradle to grave” stewardshipresponsibility for these legacies, and minimize the potential for any environmental releases.

In addition to the budget request for the important technical work discussed above, program directionand facilities funding is required for continued support of the Program’s operations and infrastructure.The $52.6M requested for facilities operations will maintain and modernize the Program’s facilities,including the Bettis and Knolls laboratories as well as ECF and Kesselring Site Operations (KSO),through capital equipment purchases and general plant projects. The $16.9M requested forconstruction funds will be used to build a materials development facility and a new office building.This will allow consolidation of work now occurring in several locations across the laboratories.Finally, the $30.3M requested for program direction will support Naval Reactors’ DOE personnel atHeadquarters and the Program’s field offices, including salaries, benefits, travel, and other expenses.


The FY 2006 budget request of $343.9 million is about 3.7 percent below the FY 2005 appropriation.The request reflects the completion the NNSA re-engineering initiative that streamlined support forcorporate management and oversight of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation programs.

Re-engineering resulted in an annual cost avoidance of over $40 million realized by the reduction ofNNSA federal staffing levels. In addition, the funding request is sufficient to support the new programfor Historically Black Colleges and Universities, initiated by Congress in FY 2005, through FY 2006.


I would like to conclude by discussing some of NNSA’s management challenges and successes. Thiscommittee is well aware of the problems that beset the Los Alamos National Laboratory during thepast year. In July 2004 the Laboratory Director imposed a stand down on essentially all activities atthe laboratory because of a series of security and safety problems, especially an inability to locate twoclassified computer disks. While a thorough investigation revealed that the “missing” disks neverexisted, it also revealed that there were serious problems with the management of safety and security atLos Alamos. Operations have now resumed and the laboratory is in the process of putting into placelong-term corrective actions. I have provided the Committee with a copy of the report prepared jointlyby the former Deputy Secretary of Energy and myself that outlines the problems in detail. As a resultof this action, I imposed a significant reduction in the management fee awarded to the University ofCalifornia for the operation of Los Alamos.

Of particular concern to me was that the federal oversight system had recognized the safety-relatedproblems at Los Alamos in advance, but not the security problems. The Committee has received anindependent assessment of this weakness in oversight. I believe it was caused by leadership failures,inadequate numbers of trained Federal security experts, a local oversight approach that did not provideenough hands on involvement, and a failure to provide sufficient headquarters supervision of the localSite Office. We are in the process of implementing corrective action in each area. I will keep theCommittee informed of our progress.

On the “success” side, the NNSA has fully embraced the President’s Management Agenda throughthe completion of the NNSA re-engineering initiative by creating a more robust and effective NNSAorganization. Additionally, NNSA’s success has been recognized with consistently “Green” ratings,including Budget and Performance Integration. NNSA integrates financial data with its budget andperformance information through implementation of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting andEvaluation (PPBE) process that was implemented simultaneously with the standup of the new NNSAorganization established by the NNSA Act.

The PPBE process is in its third year of implementation, and seeks to provide a fully integratedcascade of program and resource information throughout the management processes, consistent withexpectations in the NNSA Act. The cascade and linkages within NNSA mirror the Headquarters andfield organization structures, and are supported by management processes, contracting, funds controland accounting documentation. The cascade and linkages are quite evident in our updated NNSA16Strategic Plan, issued last November.

We at NNSA take very seriously the responsibility to manage the resources of the American peopleeffectively and I am glad that our management efforts are achieving such results.

Finally, to provide more effective supervision of high-hazard nuclear operations, I have established aChief, Defense Nuclear Safety and appointed an experienced safety professional to the position. I believe this will help us balance the need for consistent standards with my stress on the authority andresponsibility of the local Site Managers.


In conclusion, I am confident that we are headed in the right direction. Our budget request willsupport continuing our progress in protecting and certifying our nuclear deterrent, reducing the globaldanger from proliferation and weapons of mass destruction, and enhancing the force projectioncapabilities of the U.S. nuclear Navy. It will enable us to continue to maintain the safety and securityof our people, information, materials, and infrastructure. Above all, it will meet the national securityneeds of the United States of the 21st century.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. A statistical appendix follows that contains the budgetfigures supporting our request. My colleagues and I would be pleased to answer any questions on the justification for the requested budget.

NNSA Appropriation and Program Summary (pdf)