Introduction
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for having me here today. This is an exciting
time: the United States is on the verge of establishing a new Government Agency
that will have sweeping responsibilities. It will enable us to more effectively
respond to today’s threats, through a streamlined and dynamic institution that will
greatly enhance our ability to respond quickly, decisively, and where necessary,
before threats against our homeland materialize. In short, we are on the verge of
making history. It’s critical that we get it right.

The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security
Administration are fully committed to the homeland security mission, and the
successful establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. We
recognize that this will require some restructuring and relocation of critical assets
now under the stewardship of the NNSA. We are prepared to support these
shifts in responsibilities, and indeed, to do what is necessary to make any
transfer of responsibilities as smooth and painless as possible.

There is an enormous amount of experience and expertise now residing in
DOE/NNSA that will be vital to the success of the new Department. Our
Technology Research and Engineering assets have been applied to homeland
security problems long before last September; since then, such contributions
became even more focused and accelerated.

We’ve conducted the PROTECT subway demonstration, which will help
provide chemical protection to the U.S. population. We deployed a prototype
biodetection capability at the winter Olympics. We have greatly increased our
work with the U.S. Customs and Coast Guard with radiation and nuclear
technology – specific areas that will directly benefit the new Department.
DOE/NNSA is committed to ensuring that its assets can continue to provide
enabling science and technology to support homeland security and counterterrorism
mission needs.

There are a number of capabilities currently residing in the Department of
Energy that will support or be transferred to the new Department. Today I want
initially to focus on those relevant to Title III of the legislation, that is, those
germane to technology research and development in support of the Homeland
Security mission.

We currently support the FBI in its role as “lead agency” in responding to
an emergency within the United States, including a potential nuclear emergency.
We expect that these emergency response functions will play a major role in
supporting the Homeland Security mission, as stipulated in Title V of the Bill. I
want to discuss these functions as well.

Before turning to those topics, let me briefly mention a few things that the
Homeland Security Act does not do. It will not affect our ability to conduct our
principle missions of stockpile stewardship, nuclear nonproliferation, naval
reactors, and, just coming to NNSA, emergency response. NNSA will retain all of
its programs and responsibilities that contribute to our ability to assure the safety,
security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile.

With respect to nuclear nonproliferation, the Administration proposes to
transfer the core of our chemical-biological WMD work and certain nuclear
programs related to the domestic threat. This is largely self-contained work and
almost exclusively supports domestic preparedness programs.

NNSA has unique assets and capabilities, developed primarily from our
work with nuclear weapons and with nonproliferation, that have been applied to
homeland security problems long before last September.

Some of these initiatives have long timelines. Long before 9/11, DOE has
led USG efforts to support “first responders” with our chemical, biological, and
nuclear research programs. We’ve worked closely with the FBI and other
agencies to ensure that cutting edge detection and identification technologies are
available to those that would need them first. And we began this work long
before there was a recognized need to do so – we took the initiative because we
anticipated the requirement. It is as good an example as any of why long-range
research is so critical to the security of this country.

We have aggressively pursued these efforts since last 9/11. But it’s time
for a more focused organization and we are committed to that change and to
continuing to provide enabling science and technology in support of homeland
security and counter-terrorism mission needs.

Title III Issues
The NNSA Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
Program conducts applied research, development, testing, and evaluation of
technologies that lead to prototype demonstrations and resultant detection systems. As such, the program strengthens the U.S. response to current and
projected threats to national security worldwide posed by the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the diversion of special nuclear
material. The R&D program provides operational organizations with innovative
systems and technologies to satisfy their nonproliferation and counter-terrorism
mission responsibilities. The program’s four main elements are:

• Nuclear explosion monitoring, which will remain within the Department of
  Energy
• Chemical and Biological National Security, which will be transferred in its
  entirety to the Department of Homeland Security
• Proliferation Detection, and
• Supporting Activities

Within the proliferation detection program is an element on nuclear
smuggling that will be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.
Proliferation detection has aspects that support both nonproliferation and
homeland security. Those elements that can be disaggregated and identified as
supporting homeland security will be transferred to the new Department. Where
the activity supports both the homeland security and non-proliferation functions,
we will examine such arrangements as joint programs. The Administration’s
proposed legislation gives the President the necessary flexibility to provide for
joint operation.

Let me describe those functions that will be transferred, after which I will
return to the subject of long-term coordination.

Major Activities Identified for Transfer
Within, the Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development
Program, the Chemical and Biological National Security Program and the nuclear
smuggling detection activity fall squarely into the Homeland Security mission and
thus have been designated for transfer in their entirety.

The Chemical and Biological National Security Program develops and
applies detection technologies entirely for domestic homeland mission
requirements, such as a prototype biological detection system used at the Salt
Lake City Olympics and a prototype chemical detection system currently being
installed in Washington D.C.’s metro system. The nuclear smuggling detection
directly supports U.S. homeland nuclear detection requirements, such as a
nuclear detection system designed for regional deployment, for example around
a major city. I wish to describe each program briefly, and then also discuss our
nuclear assessments program, which is also to be transferred.

Chemical and Biological National Security Program
The Chemical and Biological National Security Program works to develop
technologies and systems to improve the U.S. capability to prepare for and
respond to domestic chemical and biological threats against civilian populations,
complementing DOD’s focus on the battlefield and military installations. As part
of its primary nuclear science and technology mission, NNSA and the National
Laboratories have developed extensive capabilities in chemistry, biology, and
materials and engineering sciences that form the basis for the NNSA chemical
and biological national security program. We have conducted research on the
biological foundations necessary to establish signatures of biological threat
agents and develop assays certified by the Centers for Disease Control for those
agents, which are applied to develop detectors.

NNSA has conducted demonstration projects of prototype detector
capabilities in partnership with other agencies to support their operational
missions, such as the systems I just mentioned that have been developed and
applied for the Olympics and the Washington Metro, to illustrate possible system
approaches for population protection. We are now working to expand the
number of signatures and assays of biological agents that we can detect with
increased sensitivity, and to improve public health response through the CDC.
The next generation of bio-detectors will detect a much wider range of agents,
which will enable public health agencies to more rapidly treat affected people.

Homeland Security Nuclear Smuggling Activities
The nuclear smuggling component of our proliferation detection program
also squarely fits within homeland security and will be transferred. NNSA and
the National Laboratories have unique insight into nuclear proliferation activities
— the facilities and infrastructure, as well as the observable signatures of nuclear
weapon development activity. We also have the capability to develop technical
solutions for the U.S. government to detect and characterize such proliferation
activities in their early stages. NNSA has worked closely with homeland security
agencies, including U.S. Customs, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Departments of
Transportation and Justice to apply this technical base to detection of nuclear
weapons and materials at U.S. borders. We have previously conducted
demonstrations with these agencies of radiation detection methods at an
international border station, a port, a rail yard, and airport personnel and
baggage handling facilities. With many of these agencies becoming part of the
new Department, it is a good fit for the R&D applications to counter nuclear
smuggling to be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.

Nuclear Threat Assessment and Trafficking in Nuclear Materials
The Department of Energy’s Nuclear Assessment Program provides a
national capability to assess accurately and swiftly the credibility of
communicated threats of nuclear terrorism. The Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) leads this unique effort. Since September 1978, the Nuclear
Assessment Program has been used to assess the credibility of over 60 nuclear
extortion threats, 25 nuclear reactor threats, 20 non-nuclear extortion threats and
approximately 650 cases involving the reported or attempted illicit sale of nuclear
materials.

When activated, DOE-based threat credibility assessment teams perform
comprehensive technical, operational and behavioral assessments of
communicated nuclear threats at the start of an actual or perceived emergency.
Since communicated nuclear threats are a serious violation of federal law, the
FBI is the lead federal agency. Since the Program’s inception in 1977, the
Nuclear Assessment Program has developed close and working relationships
with its counter-terrorism counterparts in Customs, State, FBI, DIA, CIA, and
others in the nonproliferation community. The Program also provides expert
technical support to law enforcement and others for Special Event Preparedness,
on-scene technical support, and national and international training.

Since 9/11 the Nuclear Assessment Program has performed
approximately 70 assessments involving communicated nuclear threats, reports
of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, and special analysis reports for law
enforcement and intelligence components. This national asset provided
immeasurable support to all government agencies tasked with separating critical
from non-critical information in the aftermath of 9/11.

Title V Issues
I want to now turn to emergency response, and Title V of the proposed bill.

The Department is prepared to respond immediately, anywhere in the
world, to discrete and specific nuclear-radiological incidences and emergencies.
People and equipment are trained, and they are ready to respond right now.

There are seven basic teams that make up this nuclear-radiological
incident response capability, which includes nuclear emergency support
activities. These include aerial measurement teams, accident response groups,
and a radiological assistance program that works closely with state and local
agencies. Through these tailored and responsive teams, NNSA marshals highly
trained and unique scientific and technical expertise, drawing across the NNSA
resources and the Department as a whole.

There are more than 900 individuals on call to respond in the event of a
nuclear-radiological incident or emergency. Only a handful of these – about 70 –
are full time. It is the ability to call upon a broad range of professionals from
across the weapons complex that brings this program its depth and ability to
respond to a wide range of crises or emergencies.

Comparisons to volunteer fire departments or National Guard units have
been made; these teams are staffed with nuclear professionals who take this
work on as additional duty. Day-to-day, they are the individuals who ensure the
safety, the security, and the reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile. It is this
everyday work that qualifies them for serving in an emergency.

To support the new Department, we envisage that these teams would,
when requested, be activated and deployed to help manage a crisis; in other
words, current practices would prevail. The team members would continue to
work in their current jobs in the Department of Energy and the NNSA. In
response to a WMD incident, our teams would deploy under the authority of the
Department of Homeland Security. We do not anticipate that the DOE-NNSA
capabilities or response to a nuclear-radiological accident or incident would be
compromised in any way by this transfer of operational control for specific
domestic responses.

Observations
With the transfer of Title III programmatic responsibilities to the
Department of Homeland Security, it will be critically important that the new
Department maintain the technical base at the National Laboratories, so that the
capability and the scientific atmosphere to pursue high risk, long-term research
be encouraged in spite of the need to focus on short-term requirements for
homeland security. It is the ability to pursue such research that makes our
national laboratories a national treasure – and a unique asset with unmatched
capabilities. Only through such investment will the scientific and technical
capability exist to meet the needs for innovative solutions to future homeland
security problems.

With respect to the remainder of the proliferation detection program, no
matter how the responsibilities are finally apportioned, the research will be of
value to both departments. For that reason, it is critical that we work together
closely. By so doing, our nonproliferation and homeland security efforts will
continue to benefit from the unparalleled capabilities of the National Laboratories.

I support fully the concept of locating the new Department’s main research
facility at Lawrence Livermore, with satellite centers of excellence located at
other national laboratories. It will create a campus-like environment where
cientists will be dedicated, full-time, to thinking about homeland security, and it
will allow for direct interaction with the expertise that resides at the other DOE
labs as well as other labs throughout the federal government. It’s good for DOE
and it’s good for the Department of Homeland Security.

Just as DOE and NNSA fully support the transfer of programs as
stipulated in Section 302 of the bill, we also believe that Title V of the bill is the
right way to incorporate the NNSA nuclear emergency response assets into the
operations of the new department.

Conclusion
I want to reiterate in no uncertain terms: The National Nuclear Security
Administration supports fully the transfer of the programs noted in Section 302(2)
of the bill under discussion. The details of what would be included in the
legislative package were worked out directly with my office. These programs are
a natural fit for the Department of Homeland Security, whose primary mission is
the critical task of protecting the United States from catastrophic terrorism.
DOE/NNSA will also work to ensure that its assets can continue to contribute
enabling science and technology in support of DHS mission needs.

Obviously, that is a goal that I am pleased to support wholeheartedly. I
believe that the Bill as being discussed goes a long way toward its realization.

Thank you, and I look forward to any questions you may have.