President Obama pledged to lead an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.  In connection with this pledge, President Obama and President Medvedev committed at their July summit in Moscow to continue to improve physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials and radioactive substances, and qualifications of professional staff.

The NNSA’s Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program plays a key role in these efforts.  The MPC&A Program serves as a first line of defense in preventing nuclear terrorism by working cooperatively with international partners to secure and eliminate potentially vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material.  By addressing potential vulnerabilities at their source, the MPC&A program is a key defense against nuclear theft and terrorism and helps partners develop a robust, comprehensive, and domestically sustainable MPC&A infrastructure. The MPC&A Program emphasizes improvements in physical protection, protective forces, material control and accounting, nuclear security culture, and creating an infrastructure that supports these programs.

Nuclear Security

• Cooperated with Russia to install nuclear security upgrades at 73 Russian nuclear warhead sites: 39 Navy sites, 25 Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) sites, and nine sites of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. 
• Cooperated with Russia to improve nuclear security at 37 Russian nuclear material sites.  Within these sites, a total of 229 buildings containing nuclear material have been identified for security upgrades. Upgrades at 210 of these buildings have been completed (92%) to date.
• In 2008, the U.S. and Russia completed the largest joint effort to secure weapons-grade nuclear material at the Mayak Production Association in Ozersk, Russia.
• Completed upgrades in 2009 to five other buildings, which do not contain nuclear material, such as central alarm stations, entry control facilities, and guard stations.
• Completed upgrades at 15 buildings containing nuclear material at 13 sites in other Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries.  
• Engaged in ongoing reciprocal nuclear security best practices dialogues with both China and Russia.

Material Consolidation and Conversion

• Worked with Russia to consolidate weapons-usable nuclear materials into fewer buildings at fewer sites in Russia and other countries.  Consolidation reduces long-term costs for installing and maintaining security upgrades.
• Worked to achieve further risk reduction by downblending weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) not from weapons to low enriched uranium (LEU).  Almost 12 metric tons of Russian non-weapons HEU have been down-blended to date.

Sustainability and Security Infrastructure

• Cooperated with Russia to enhance national-level MPC&A Russian infrastructure by developing regulations and procedures for MPC&A operations, strengthening inspection and oversight capabilities, enhancing  nuclear security culture, developing training and education programs, upgrading protective force training and housing facilities, and upgrading key elements of the nuclear weapons and material transport infrastructure. 
• Worked with Russia and other FSU partners to implement 162 MPC&A regulations into the development phase to date.  All civilian regulatory work will be in the development phase or completed by 2011.
• Worked with Russia to upgrade secure transportation assets for nuclear material. As of October 2009, 97 cargo trucks, 115 escort vehicles, 77 cargo railcars, 25 guard railcars and 283 security overpacks (reinforced nuclear material transport containers) have been deployed.
• Supported sustainability of Russian nuclear warhead site security through a network of regional technical centers and jointly coordinating site initiatives that will enhance spare parts provision, maintenance, repair, logistical support and training.