NNSA Nuclear Nonproliferation Achievements

Scope of Committment

$2 billion budget (FY08 appropriation more than doubles 2001 appropriation).
Engaging over 100 countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), through 19 programmatic activities.
Contributed $50 million to the IAEA to facilitate the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank.
Nearly $45 million in international contributions and pledges from 7 countries.
3 Service to America Award winners.

Securing Civilian Nuclear and Radiological Materials Worldwide

Converted 52 reactors in 30 countries from high-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) (an additional 4 shutdown).
Returned over 610 kg of Russian origin HEU; over 1,192 kg of U.S. HEU; and over 140 kg of other HEU material.
Secured more than 730 vulnerable radiological sites overseas (over 9 million curies worth); recovered over 18,500 radiological sources domestically (over 440,000 curies).

Securing Russian Nuclear Weapons Material

Completed MPC&A upgrades at 86% of Russian nuclear weapons sites of concern; Bratislava work to be completed by the end of 2008.
A new U.S.-Russian plan identifies the requirements for Rosatom to sustain security upgrades installed over the past 14 years.

Detecting and Deterring Illicit International Nuclear Transfers

In 2006, U.S. and Russia agreed to equip all of Russia’s border crossings with radiation detection devices by 2011 (6 years ahead of schedule). To date, the U.S. has equipped 160 crossings and Russia has equipped approximately an equal number.
Outside of Russia, radiation detection systems are operational at 19 Megaports with work underway in 20 additional Megaports around the world; and also operational at 53 international border crossings (land, rail, air and feeder ports) in 12 countries.
Reviewed over 7,000 export licenses/requests for proliferation risk last year, recommending denial of 227.

Strengthening and Expanding International Nonproliferation Efforts

Repacked and removed 550 MT of uranium and 4,000 curies of radiological sources from the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Complex in Iraq.
Launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to strengthen nuclear safeguards applied by the IAEA; strengthened the Nuclear Suppliers Group export control guidelines and control lists.
Oversaw disablement and ongoing activities at North Korean facilities; worked to dismantle Libya’s WMD program.
Engaged thousands of former weapons scientists and engineers in the former Soviet Union, Libya and Iraq, helping redirect their talents to civilian pursuits while preventing the flow of WMD expertise to countries of proliferation concern and terrorist groups.
Trained nearly 6,000 domestic export enforcement officials in WMD awareness and over 10,500 international export control officials on WMD identification and strategic trade controls since 9/11; in FY08, on track to train 1,000 U.S. officials in WMD export controls.
Trained over 250 foreign officials annually on physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and trained over 1,000 foreign facility operators on nuclear material control and accounting procedures.

Eliminating Weapons-Usable Material

Monitored downblending of over 344 MT of former Soviet weapons-origin HEU for use in U.S. power plants, providing 10% of U.S. electricity.
Downblended over 100 MT (enough for approximately 2,200 nuclear weapons) of surplus U.S. HEU into LEU for use as nuclear reactor fuel, with an additional 15 MT packaged and shipped for downblending (total of nearly 115 MT). Also converted almost 11 MT of Russian non-weapons excess HEU into LEU.
Initiated downblending of an additional 17.4 MT of HEU for the Reliable Fuel Supply initiative.
Amending the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement to reflect a technically and financially credible plan for Russian plutonium disposition.
Working to dispose of at least 68 MT (enough for 8,500 nuclear weapons) of U.S. and Russian weapons-grade plutonium by converting it into mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors. Continuing construction of the U.S. Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility.
Ended 43 years of weapons-grade plutonium production in Seversk by shutting down two weapons-grade plutonium production reactors; actively pursuing the closure of the Zheleznogorsk plutonium production reactor ahead of the projected 2010 schedule by providing a fossil fuel replacement, thereby eliminating weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia.
Monitoring the safe storage of over 9 MT of Russian weapons-grade plutonium (nearly 1,125 warheads) to ensure that it is not used in the Russian nuclear weapons program.

Research and Development

Advanced the state-of-the-art in timely and accurate analysis of nuclear proliferation related materials.
Developed novel materials to significantly improve detection of smuggled nuclear materials or improvised devices.
Delivered new ground and space based systems to better detect underground and atmospheric nuclear detonations.
Transferred 40 advanced safeguards technologies to foreign partners to strengthen IAEA safeguards; initiated 85 ongoing collaborative nuclear safeguards research and development projects in 15 countries.